yuga.com
Number 94 of the Top 100 · Tranco rank 105
Can yuga.com be forged?
Can yuga.com be forged?
No. Receivers that check DMARC refuse mail that forges yuga.com or its subdomains.
- The exact name
- reject · subdomains reject · reports to DMARC Digests
- Names that copy
- 105 registered lookalikes can send mail. DMARC never sees them. See them →
What we noticed
- The SPF record marks an unlisted sender as a soft failure. A hard failure is stronger.
Senders it names Google Workspace, Zendesk
- Google Workspace include:_spf.google.com· DKIM key found
- Zendesk include:mail.zendesk.com
- Google Workspace runs its mail hosts
These are the services the records name. A record can name a service no longer used, and a sender can sign without being named.
SPF~all · 2 of 10 lookups · 124 thousand addresses
Flags others · 2 of 10 lookups · 0 of 2 void lookups · 124,416 IPv4 addresses · 6 IPv6 blocks · Includes of its senders
Every term and include
DKIM1 key found
- google._domainkey · rsa 2048· Google Workspace
We look under the selectors of the services the records name. A domain can have keys we do not find.
Sending names 1 name, 1 at reject
| Name | Policy | SPF lookups | Reports to |
|---|---|---|---|
| support.yuga.com | reject (inherited) | 1 | — |
ReportsDMARC Digests
Aggregate reports (rua) go to mailto:dmarc@yuga.com, mailto:re+1212ef40cc9c@inbound.dmarcdigests.com. No failure reports are asked for.
Transport MTA-STS none · TLS-RPT none · BIMI none
MTA-STS asks senders to deliver to yuga.com over encrypted connections only. TLS-RPT asks for reports when they cannot. BIMI shows a logo beside mail that passes DMARC at quarantine or reject.
Read on Oct 28, 2026. Check it again yourself →
Watch your own domain's mail this way: Sender Security · the DMARC Report